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1 Introduction
Bayesian games, or games with incomplete information, describe situations in
which there is uncertainty about players’ payo¤s, and di¤erent players have
(typically) di¤erent private information about the realized state of nature !
that determines the payo¤s. The private information of a player i can often
be represented by a partition of the space - of all states of nature (in which
case i knows to which element of the partition the realized ! belongs), or more
generally, by a ¾-…eld zi of measurable sets in - (in which case i knows, given
a set in zi; whether the realized ! is located in this set). If the attention is
con…ned to two-person zero-sum games with incomplete information, each player
has an optimal strategy and the value of a game is well de…ned, under quite
general conditions on the expected payo¤ function (see Sion (1958)). This work
concerns continuity of the value of a game, as a function of players’ information
endowments (…elds), when the closeness of …elds is measured by means of the
Boylan (1971) pseudo-metric.
It turns out that the value has strong continuity properties. We …nd that,
when the payo¤ function is Lipschitz-continuous in strategies at each state of
nature,1 the value is a uniformly continuous function of players’ information
…elds (see Theorem 1).2 If, in addition, the state-dependent Lispchitz constant
of the payo¤ function is bounded, then the value is in fact a Lipchitz-continuous
function of the information …elds (see Corollary 1). Moreover, the correspon-
dence describing players’ optimal strategies as a function of information is upper
semi-continuous, even with respect to the weak convergence topology on each
player’s set of strategies (see Theorem 3).
These continuity properties of the value (and optimal strategies) in zero-
sum games stand somewhat in contrast to the well-known discontinuity of the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (NE) correspondence3 in general (non zero-sum)
games with incomplete information. The NE correspondence is not lower semi-
continuous – that is, NE strategies may not be approachable by NE strategies
in games with slightly modi…ed information endowments – as was established
by, e.g., Monderer and Samet (1996)4 in a setting identical to ours. However,
it also may not be upper semi-continuous as we show here (see Remark 2,
where we consider a simple coordination game), because of the weak mode of
strategy convergence that we assume. While this mode of convergence su¢ces
for upper semi-continuity of the optimal strategy correspondence in zero-sum
1 This requirement is satis…ed, for instance, by games which have the matrix-game form in
all states of nature.
2 This result requires a mild assumption of q-integrability on the state-dependent Lipschitz
constant. When this constant is merely integrable, the value is also continuous (see Theorem
2), but not uniformly.
3 The NE payo¤s correspondence is also discontinuous.
4 In fact, Monderer and Samet (1996), as well as Kajii and Morris (1998) in a …xed-types
model of incomplete information, are concerned precisely with the question of what topology
on information endowments (or information structure) would lead to lower semi-continuity of
NE.
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games, it fails to do similar work in general games5 . This di¤erence emphasizes
the important role played by the zero-sum assumption when the continuity of
equilibrium strategies is considered.
The continuity of the NE correspondence with respect to changes in infor-
mation has been studied by other authors. In this paper, we use the basic set-up
of Monderer and Samet (1996), who work with information …elds to describe
players’ varying private information, with the common prior distribution of the
states of nature (prior belief) …xed at all times. This follows a certain tradi-
tion of modelling information in economic theory (see, e.g., Allen (1983), Cotter
(1986), Stinchcombe (1990), VanZandt (2002), and Einy et al (2003)). However,
there is another approach to continuity of NE correspondences, which is with
respect to players’ prior beliefs (see, e.g., Milgrom and Weber (1985), Kajii and
Morris (1998))6 . In this approach, prior beliefs are variable, but the rest of the
information structure (in which the space of states of nature is assumed to be
the cross product of the sets of players’ types 7 , and each player’s private infor-
mation is given by the knowledge of his type) is …xed throughout. Perturbing
the common prior belief in‡uences the expected payo¤s of all agents, but does
not a¤ect the players’ strategy sets. However, our setting emphasizes di¤erences
in information, allowing the information structure of a game to be perturbed in
a way that directly a¤ects only one individual player, or in a way that a¤ects all
players di¤erently. Indeed, a change in the private information of both players
induces (typically di¤erent) changes in players’ strategy sets, due to the con-
straint of the strategy’s measurability with respect to the player’s information
…eld. While the impact of these information changes on the structure of the
game might appear to be signi…cant, our theorems show that the value and the
optimal strategies in zero-sum games are nevertheless well behaved with respect
to these changes.
Our paper is organized as follows. The set-up is described in Section 2. Our
results (Theorems 1, 2, 3 and Corollaries 1, 2) are stated and proved in Section
3; Remarks 1 and 2 appear at the end of this section. The Appendix contains
the proof of a technical Lemma 1.
2 Preliminaries
We consider zero-sum games with two players, i = 1; 2: Games are played in
an uncertain environment, which a¤ects payo¤ functions of the players. The
underlying uncertainty is described by a probability space (-; z; ¹) ; where - is
the space of states of nature, z is a ¾-…eld of subsets of -; and ¹ is a countably
additive probability measure on (-; z) ; which represents the common prior
5 Even the payo¤ functions in a typical game would be discontinuous in the weak topology
on strategies.
6 In this context, Milgrom and Weber (1986) established upper semi-continuity of the NE
correspondence under certain conditions on the information structure. The objective of Kajii
and Morris (1998), as we already mentioned, is to …nd ways to obtain lower semi-continuity
of the NE payo¤s correspondence.
7 A set representing other uncertainties (not type-related) is also taken in the cross product.
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of the players regarding the realized state of nature: The initial information
endowment of player i is given by a ¾-sub…eld zi of z:
Each player i = 1; 2 has a set Si of strategies, which is a convex and compact
subset of a Euclidean space Rni . We will assume, without loss of generality, that
maxs2S1[S2 ksk · 1; where k¢k stands for the Euclidean norm in Rn1 or Rn2 :
There is, in addition, a measurable8 real valued payo¤ function u : -£S1£S2 !
R; such that u
¡¢;s1; s2¢ is integrable for every ¡s1; s2¢ 2 S1 £ S2: For every
state of nature ! 2 -; u!
¡
s1; s2
¢
= u
¡
!; s1; s2
¢
represents the payo¤ received
by player 1 (and the loss incurred by player 2) when each player i chooses to
play si : We assume that each u! is a Lipschitz function with constant K(!);
that is, ¯¯
u!
¡
s1; s2
¢ ¡ u! ¡t1; t2¢¯¯ · K(!)(°°s1 ¡ t1°° + °°s2 ¡ t2°°): (1)
We also assume that the function K(¢) is z-measurable, and that there exists
q > 1 such that it is q-integrable9 :Z
-
(K (!))q d¹ (!) < 1: (2)
The probability space (-; z; ¹) ; information endowments z1 and z2; strat-
egy sets S1 and S2; and the payo¤ function u fully describe a zero-sum Bayesian
game. To concentrate on the e¤ects of changes in information endowments, we
keep all the attributes of the game …xed, with the exception of z1 and z2
that are variable. Thus, we denote the game by G(z1; z2); to emphasize its
changeable characteristics.
A Bayesian strategy of player i is an zi -measurable function xi : - ! Si:
The set of all Bayesian strategies of player i will be denoted by X i
¡
zi
¢
:
For p ¸ 1; denote by Lnp (-; z; ¹) the Banach space of all z-measurable
functions10 x : - ! Rn such that
kxkp ´
µZ
-
kx (!)kp d¹ (!)
¶ 1
p
< 1 (3)
(recall that k¢k stands for the Euclidean norm on Rn). We will con…ne most
of our attention to a particular p > 1; given by p = qq¡1 for q used in (2).
The weak topology on Lnp (-; z; ¹) is the one in which the linear functional
'y (x) ´
R
- x (!) ¢ y (!)d¹ (!) is continuous for any given y 2 Lnq (-; z; ¹) :
Note that X i
¡
zi
¢
is a weakly closed subset of the unit ball in Lnip
¡
-; zi ; ¹
¢
(metrizable and compact in the weak topology): In fact, since the limit of every
Lnip (-; z; ¹)-weakly converging sequence in X i (zi) is zi-measurable by Lemma
1 in the Appendix, X i (zi) is also a weakly compact subset of the unit ball in
Lnip (-; z; ¹) :
8 The measurability is with respect to z in the …rst coordinate, and with respect to the
Borel ¾-…elds in the second and third coordinates.
9 This condition is relaxed in Theorem 2.
10 Or, to be precise, their equivalence classes, where any two functions which are equal
¹-almost everywhere are identi…ed.
4
The expected payo¤ of player 1 (and the expected loss of player 2) when
xi 2 X i ¡zi¢ is chosen by i is11
U(x1; x2) ´ E ¡u¢ ¡x1 (¢) ; x2 (¢)¢¢ = Z
-
u!
¡
x1(w); x2 (w)
¢
d¹ (!) :
This also de…nes U for all (x1; x2) 2 X1 (z) £ X2 (z).
If minx22X2(z 2) maxx12X1 (z1) U (x1; x2) and maxx12X 1(z 1) minx22X 2(z2 ) U(x1; x2)
are well de…ned, and
min
x22X 2(z2 )
max
x12X 1(z1 )
U(x1; x2) = max
x12X1(z1)
min
x22X2(z2)
U (x1; x2); (4)
then the common value v = v(z1; z2) of the two expressions in (4) is called
the value of the zero-sum Bayesian game G(z1; z2). Note that v is the value
of G(z1; z2) if and only if there exists a pair of Bayesian strategies (x1; x2) 2
X1 (z1) £ X2 (z2) such that for every (y1; y2) 2 X1 (z1) £ X2 (z2)
U (x1; y2) ¸ U (x1; x2) = v ¸ U(y1; x2): (5)
Strategy xi is called optimal for player i: Any pair (x1; x2) of optimal strategies
satis…es (5).
The value exists under quite general conditions on the expected payo¤ func-
tion U in the game: We shall assume that U is weakly continuous1 2 on X1 (z)£
X2 (z) separately in every variable, and that it is quasi-concave in x1 and quasi-
convex in x2. This implies existence of the value by Sion (1958) theorem.
The most prevalent form of a payo¤ function that gives rise to such U is the
usual matrix game. In a matrix game,
u!
¡
s1; s2
¢
= s1A(!)s2; (6)
where A(!) is an n1£n2 matrix, with A(!)i;j being the payo¤ of player 1 when
he chooses pure strategy i and 2 – pure strategy j. Accordingly, s1; s2 should
be thought of as mixed strategies of players 1 and 2, with each Si being the ni-
dimensional simplex. Weak continuity in each variable of the corresponding U;
as well as condition (1), are guaranteed if, for instance, a(!) = maxi;j jAi;j (!)j
is q-integrable.
Finally, we de…ne convergence of players’ information endowments by means
of the following pseudo-metric (introduced in Boylan (1971)) on the family z¤
of ¾ -sub…elds of z:
d (z1; z2) = sup
A2z1
inf
B2z 2
¹ (A4B) + sup
B2z2
inf
A2z1
¹ (A4B) ;
11 The integral below is well de…ned, due to integrability of each u
¡¢; s1 ; s2¢ , assumption
(1), and integrability of K (¢) (which follows from its q-integrability).
12 Since information endowments z1 and z2 of the players may vary from game to game
(while the payo¤ function is …xed), the weak continuity of U is assumed on the set X1 (z)£
X2 (z) ; and not on its proper subset of players’ strategy pro…les X1 (z1)£ X2 (z2) in the
game G(z1; z2): Clearly, weak continuity of U on X1 (z)£X2 (z) induces its weak continuity
on each X1 (z1)£X2 (z2) :
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where A4B = (AnB) [ (BnA) is the “symmetric di¤erence” of A and B: If
xi 2 X i (z) and z0 2 z¤ ; denote by E(xi j z0) 2 X i (z0) the conditional
expectation of xi with respect to the …eld z0: If ni = 1 (that is, if Si ½ [¡1;1]);
it is known – see, e.g., Van Zandt (1993)13 – that for any two z1; z2 2 z¤;°°E(xi j z1) ¡ E(xi j z2)°°1 · 16d (z1; z2) :
When ni > 1;°°E(xi j z1) ¡ E(xi j z2)°°1 = Z
-
°°E(xi j z1) ¡ E(xi j z2)°° d¹ (!)
·
Z
-
p
ni
niX
j=1
¯¯
E(xij j z1) ¡ E(xij j z2)
¯¯
d¹ (!)
· pni
niX
j=1
°°E(xij j z1) ¡ E(xij j z2)°°1
· 16n 32i d (z1; z2) :
Consequently, °°E(xi j z1) ¡ E(xi j z2)°°1 · 16n32i d (z1;z2) : (7)
3 Results
Given two pairs of …elds in z¤, (z11; z21) and (z12; z22) (where zij is the informa-
tion endowment of player i = 1; 2 in pair j = 1; 2), the distance between them
will be measured by the following pseudo-metric:
d
¡
(z11; z21); (z12; z22)
¢ ´ max[d(z11; z12); d(z21; z22)]:
Theorem 1. The value v(z1; z2) is a uniformly continuous function of
(z1; z2) 2 z¤ £z¤; with respect to the pseudo-metric d: Moreover, for any two
(z11; z21); (z12;z22) 2 z¤ £ z¤;¯¯
v(z11; z21) ¡ v(z12; z22)
¯¯ · C £ d ¡(z11; z21); (z12; z22)¢¤ 1p ; (8)
13 Van Zandt (1993) quotes Rogge (1974) and Landers and Rogge (1986), where it is shown
that kE(f j z1)¡E(f j z2)k1 · 8d (z1 ; z2) for all z-measurable functions f with values in
[0; 1]:
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where C > 0 is a constant given by
C ´ 4(4 max (n1;n2)) 32p kKkq : (9)
Proof. We will establish inequality (8), which obviously implies the …rst
part of the theorem. For any two given (z11; z21); (z12; z22) 2 z¤ £ z¤ ; let
x1 2 X1 ¡z11¢ be an optimal strategy of player 1 in the game G(z11; z21); and
pick y2 2 X2 ¡z22¢ : Now denote x12 ´ E(x1 j z12) 2 X1 ¡z12¢ and y21 ´ E(y2 j
z21) 2 X2
¡
z21
¢
: The optimality of x1 in G(z11; z21) implies
U (x1;y21) ¸ v(z11; z21): (10)
Note that ¯¯
U (x1; y21) ¡ U
¡
x12; y
2¢¯¯
(by (1))
·
Z
-
K (!)
°°x1 (!) ¡ x12 (!)°° d¹ (!) + Z
-
K(!)
°°y21 (!) ¡ y2 (!)°°d¹ (!)
(by the Hölder inequality)
· kKkq
³°°x1 ¡ x12°°p + °°y21 ¡ y2°°p´
(since
°°x1 (!) ¡ x12 (!)°° ; °°y21 (!) ¡ y2 (!)°° · 2 for ¹-almost every ! 2 -)
· 2 p¡1p kK kq
ÃµZ
-
°°x1 (!) ¡ x12 (!)°°d¹ (!)¶ 1p + µZ
-
°°y21 (!) ¡ y2 (!)°° d¹ (!)¶ 1p
!
= 2
p¡1
p kKkq
³°°x1 ¡ x12°° 1p1 + °°y21 ¡ y2°° 1p1 ´
= 2
p¡1
p kKkq
³°°E(x1 j z11) ¡ E(x1 j z12)°° 1p1 + °°E(y2 j z21) ¡ E(y2 j z22)°° 1p1 ´
(by (7))
· 2p¡1p
³
16max
³
n
3
2
1 ;n
3
2
2
´´1
p kK kq
³£
d(z11; z12)
¤ 1
p +
£
d(z21; z22)
¤ 1
p
´
:
· 4
³
8 max
³
n
3
2
1 ; n
3
2
2
´´ 1
p kKkq
£
d
¡
(z11; z21); (z12; z22)
¢¤ 1
p :
= 4 (4 max (n1; n2))
3
2p kKkq
£
d
¡
(z11; z21); (z12; z22)
¢¤ 1
p :
To summarize, we have shown that¯¯
U (x1; y21) ¡ U
¡
x12; y2
¢¯¯ · C £ d ¡(z11; z21); (z12; z22)¢¤ 1p : (11)
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Together with (10), (11) implies that
U
¡
x12;y2
¢ ¸ v(z11;z21) ¡ C £ d ¡(z11; z21); (z12; z22)¢¤ 1p :
This holds for every y2 2 X2 ¡z22¢ ; and hence it follows that
v(z12; z22) = max
y12X 1(z12)
min
y22X2(z22)
U(y1; y2) (12)
¸ min
y22X 2(z22)
U(x12; y
2) ¸ v(z11; z21) ¡ C
£
d
¡
(z11; z21); (z12; z22)
¢¤ 1
p : (13)
Using similar arguments (when we start from an optimal strategy x2 2
X2
¡
z21
¢
of player 2 in the game G(z11; z21)) we can show that, for x22 = E(x2 j
z22) 2 X2
¡
z22
¢
; the following inequality
U
¡
y1; x22
¢ · v(z11;z21) + C £ d ¡(z11; z21); (z12; z22)¢¤ 1p
holds for every y1 2 X1 ¡z12¢ : This leads to
v(z12; z22) = min
y22X 2(z22)
max
y12X1(z12)
U(y1; y2) (14)
· max
y12X 1(z12)
U(y1; x22) · v(z11; z21) + C
£
d
¡
(z11; z21); (z12; z22)
¢¤ 1
p : (15)
The combination of (12)-(13) and (14)-(15) now implies (8). ¥
The continuity of the value as a function of (z1; z2) is, of course, an imme-
diate implication of Theorem 1:
Corollary 1. Suppose that
©
zik
ª1
k=1 ½ F ¤ is a sequence such that limk!1 zik =
zi in the Boylan pseudo-metric; for i = 1;2: Then limk!1 v(z1k; z2k ) = v(z1; z2):
If K(¢) is a bounded function, it is obvious that (2) holds for every q > 1;
and thus p = qq¡1 can be chosen to be arbitrarily close to 1. The constant
C = C(p); de…ned in (9), converges to the limit
32 max
³
n
3
2
1 ; n
3
2
2
´
kK k1
when p approaches 1 (kKk1 stands for the essential supremum of K). Inequality
(8) of Theorem 1 thus provides us with the following corollary:
Corollary 2. If K(¢) is a bounded function, the value v(z1; z2) is a Lips-
chitz function of (z1; z2) 2 z¤ £ z¤ ; with respect to the pseudo-metric d:
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It is natural to ask whether the value is continuous when K (¢) is only in-
tegrable (that is, in L11 (-; z; ¹)), and not q-integrable for some q > 1 as is
assumed in (2). Our next theorem shows that the continuity holds even under
this more general assumption. However, it does not follow from Theorem 1
(since we do not have uniform continuity in this case) and has to be established
directly (using similar techniques). The continuity of U (separately in each vari-
able) is now assumed with respect to the Lnip (-; z;¹)-weak topology on each
coordinate,14 for some p > 1:
Theorem 2. The statement of Corollary 1 remains valid even if K(¢) is only
integrable. That is, if
©
zik
ª1
k=1 ½ F ¤ is a sequence such that limk!1 zik = zi
in the Boylan pseudo-metric; for i = 1; 2; then limk!1 v(z1k; z2k) = v(z1; z2):
Proof. Suppose by the way of contradiction that the (bounded) sequence©
v(z1k; z2k )
ª1
k=1
has a subsequence that converges to v0 6= v(z1; z2); without
loss of generality, let this subsequence be
©
v(z1k ; z2k)
ª1
k=1 itself. Also let x
1
k be
an optimal strategy of player 1 in the game G(z1k ; z2k ); for every k = 1; 2; 3; ::: As
was mentioned, X1 (z) is a weakly compact subset of the (metrizable) unit ball
in Ln1p (-; z; ¹) ; and therefore there is a subsequence
©
x1kl
ª1
l=1
which converges
weakly to some x1 2 X1 (z) : By Lemma 1 in the Appendix x1 is z1-measurable,
which implies that x1 2 X1 ¡z1¢ :
Now …x y2 2 X2 ¡z2¢ ; and, for every k = 1; 2; 3; :::; let y2kl ´ E(y2 j z2kl ) 2
X2
¡
z2kl
¢
: Since x1kl is an optimal strategy of 1 in G(z
1
kl; z
2
kl );
U (x1kl ;y
2
kl) ¸ v(z1kl ; z2kl ): (16)
Since y2kl ! l!1 y2 in Ln21 (-;z; ¹) by (7), there is a subsequence of
©
y2kl
ª1
l=1
that converges pointwise to y2 ¹-almost everywhere; without loss of generality,
the sequence itself converges pointwise. Note that¯¯
U(x1kl; y
2
kl ) ¡ U
¡
x1;y2
¢
)
¯¯ · ¯¯U (x1kl ; y2kl) ¡ U ¡x1kl; y2¢)¯¯+¯¯U(x1kl ; y2) ¡ U ¡x1; y2¢)¯¯
(by (1))
·
Z
-
K (!)
°°y2kl (!) ¡ y2 (!)°°d¹ (!) + ¯¯U (x1kl ;y2) ¡ U ¡x1; y2¢)¯¯ :
The …rst term in the above expression converges to zero as l ! 1 by the
bounded convergence theorem, and the second terms also converges to zero since
14 This assumption is satis…ed quite often. For instance, when the matrix game (as in (6)) is
considered, and maxi;j jAi;j(!)j is only integrable, the expected payo¤ function U(x1 ; x2) =R
- x
1(w)A(!)x2 (w) d¹(!) is Lp-weakly continuous in each coordinate separately, for every
p > 1: This is so because strategies of both players are uniformly bounded, and A(!) can be
approximated in the L1 -norm by bounded matrices.
U is weakly continuous in each variable separately. Thus, liml!1 U (x1kl ; y
2
kl) =
U
¡
x1; y2
¢
; and together with (16) this implies
U(x1; y2) ¸ lim
l!1
v(z1kl ; z
2
kl) = v
0; (17)
this inequality holds for every y2 2 X2 ¡z2¢ : Thus,
v(z1; z2) = max
y12X 1(z1 )
min
y22X2 (z2)
U(y1; y2) (18)
¸ min
y22X2(z 2)
U (x1; y2) ¸ v0: (19)
Using similar arguments (when we start from …nding a limit point x2 of a
sequence
©
x2k
ª1
k=1 of optimal strategies of player 2 in games G(z
1
k; z2k)) we can
show that
U (y1; x2) · lim
l!1 v(z
1
kl ; z
2
kl) = v
0 (20)
for every y1 2 X1 ¡z1¢ : This leads to
v(z1; z2) = min
y22X 2(z2 )
max
y12X1 (z1)
U(y1; y2) (21)
· max
y12X1(z 1)
U (y1; x2) · v0: (22)
The combination of (18)-(19) and (21)-(22) now imply v0 = v(z1; z2); contra-
dicting the initial assumption: This contradiction establishes limk!1 v(z1k ; z2k ) =
v(z1; z2): ¥
The following theorem follows quite easily from the proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. The optimal strategy correspondence is upper semi-continuous
for both players. That is, if
©
zik
ª1
k=1
½ F ¤ are such that limk!1 zik = zi in
the Boylan pseudo-metric for every i = 1;2, and
©
(x1k ; x
2
k )
ª1
k=1 is such that
(x1k ; x2k ) is a pair of optimal strategies in G(z1k; z2k) and limk!1 (x1k ; x2k) =
(x1; x2) weakly in both coordinates, then (x1; x2) is a pair of optimal strategies
in G(z1; z2):
Proof. As was said, this uses the proof of Theorem 2. The …rst part of that
proof (leading to (17)) can be utilized to show that U (x1; y2) ¸ limk!1 v(z1k; z2k)
for every y2 2 X2 ¡z2¢ : However, by Theorem 2, limk!1 v(z1k; z2k ) = v(z1; z2);
and so x1 is indeed an optimal strategy of 1 in G(z1; z2): Similarly, the second
part of the proof can be used to show that x2 is an optimal strategy of 2: ¥
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Remark 1. The optimal strategy correspondence is not lower semi-continuous
in general.1 5 That is, it may be the case that limk!1 zik = zi in the Boylan
pseudo-metric and (x1; x2) is pair of optimal strategies in G(z1;z2); but there
is no sequence
©
(x1k; x2k)
ª1
k=1 of optimal strategies in G(z
1
k; z2k) that converges
to (x1; x2) weakly in both coordinates. Indeed, consider the situation where
- = [¡1; 1] ; z is the ¾-…eld of Borel sets in -; ¹ is the normalized Lebesgue
measure on -; S1 = [0; 1] ; S2 = f0g ; and u ¡!;s1; s2¢ = !s1: Now let z1k = z2k
be the ¾-…eld which is generated by all Borel subsets of
£¡1; ¡1 + 1k¤ and the
set (an “atom”) (¡1 + 1k ; 1]; for all k = 1; 2; 3; :::; and z1 = z2 = f;; -g : Then
clearly limk!1 zik = zi for i = 1; 2. However, consider a pair (x1; x2) ´ (0; 0)
of optimal strategies in the game G(z1; z2). Since any optimal strategy x1k of
1 in the game G(z1k; z2k ) satis…es x1k (!) = 1 for every ! 2 (¡1 + 1k ; 1]; there
exists no sequence of optimal strategies of 1 in
©
G(z1k ; z2k )
ª1
k=1 that converges
to x1. ¥
Remark 2. Given Theorem 3 on upper semi-continuity of the optimal
strategy correspondence for zero-sum games, it is natural to ask whether its
counterpart for non-zero-sum games, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (NE) cor-
respondence, is upper semi-continuous in the same way. (It is clearly not lower
semi-continuous, since even the optimal strategy correspondence in zero-sum
games is not.) The answer to the above question is negative. The discontinuous
behavior of the NE correspondence in our setting is due to a markedly weak
requirement on convergence of NE strategies: they only need to converge in the
weak topology. While this weak mode of converges su¢ces to obtain optimal
strategies in the limit for zero-sum games (and adds strength to Theorem 3),
the situation is di¤erent for NE in non-zero-sum games. The pitfall that the
weak topology brings with it is the typical discontinuity of the expected payo¤
function in all strategies simultaneously1 6 ; in zero-sum games continuity in both
variables separately did the job, but not so in general games.
To construct an example of discontinuous NE, consider a non-zero-sum
Bayesian game with two players, i = 1; 2; in which - = S1 = S2 = [0; 1]
(each player has two pure strategies, 0 and 1, and the open interval (0; 1) con-
stitutes the set of completely mixed strategies), z is the ¾-…eld of Borel sets
in -; and ¹ is the normalized Lebesgue measure on -: Both players play the
same coordination game in all states of nature: the matrix which de…nes players’
15 As was already mentioned, Monderer and Samet (1996) show that the Nash equilibrium
(NE) correspondence is not lower semi-continuous. The example that we present here shows
the lack of lower semi-continuity of NE in zero-sum games (and even in one-person decision
problems).
16 In the …xed-types set-up of Milgrom and Weber (1986), the expected payo¤ functions were
simultaneously continuous in all players’ strategies; in fact, this was shown to imply upper
semi-continuity of the NE correspondence. However, this continuity of payo¤ funcions was
partly the result of a su¢cient spread of the common prior distribution of players’ types (that
the assumptions of Milgrom and Weber imply in the case where each type is, say, an interval).
This feature would make their analysis inapplicable in the complete information case, which
is precsely what we consider in our example in the next paragraph.
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payo¤s for pure strategy pro…les is
s2 = 0 s2 = 1
s1 = 0 (2; 2) (0;0)
s1 = 1 (0; 0) (1;1)
:
Thus, u1
¡
!;s1; s2
¢
= u2
¡
!; s1; s2
¢ ´ s1s2 + 2¡1 ¡ s1¢ ¡1 ¡ s2¢ : Also let z1k =
z2k = z:
For every k = 1; 2; 3; ::: partition - = [0; 1] into 2k consecutive intervals of
equal length, I1 (k) ; :::;I2k (k) : Now consider a sequence
©
x1k ;x
2
k )
ª1
k=1 of sym-
metric NE strategies in G(z; z), given by
x1k (!) = x
2
k (!) ´ xk (!) =
½
1; if ! 2 In (k) for even n;
0; if ! 2 In (k) for odd n:
It is known that fxkg1k=1 converges weakly17 ;18 to the constant function x ´ 12 :
However, (x; x) is clearly not an NE in G(z; z): ¥
4 Appendix
Lemma 1. Let fzkg1k=1 ½ z¤ be a sequence such that limk!1 zk = z0
in the Boylan pseudo-metric. If fxkg1k=1 ½
Q1
k=1 X
i (zk) is a sequence of
functions that converges weakly to x 2 X i (z) ; then x is z0-measurable (that
is, x 2 X i (z0)).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that
1X
k=1
d (zk ; z0) < 1 (23)
(otherwise consider instead some subsequence fzklg1l=1 with
P1
l=1 d (zkl; z0) <1). For every k denote by Gk the ¾-…eld W1n=k zk, that is, the minimal ¾-
sub…eld of z which contains each one of fzng1n=k : It follows from (23) by
Corollary 2 of Van Zandt (1993) that limk!1 Gk = z0:
Since fxkg1k=1 converges weakly to x; by Banach-Saks theorem there exists
a sequence fxkg1k=1 that converges to x strongly (that is, in the k:kp norm),
and each xk is a convex combination of fxng1n=k : Thus, xk 2 X i (Gk) for every
k = 1;2; 3; ::: By Lemma 1 in Einy et al (2003), the strong limit of fxkg1k=1 is
measurable with respect to limk!1 Gk = z0: We conclude that x 2 X i (z0). ¥
17 Assuming that p = q = 2:
18 Indeed,
©
2(xk ¡ 12 )
ª1
k=1 is the sequence of Rademacher functions that converges weakly
to zero.
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